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Abstract 
Over the last 25 years the Social Security Disability Insurance Program (DI) has grown 
dramatically. During the same period of time employment rates for men with work limitations 
showed substantial declines in both absolute and relative terms. While the timing of these trends 
suggests that the expansion of DI was a major contributor to employment decline and raises 
questions about the targeting of disability benefits, studies using denied applicants suggest a 
more modest role for DI expansion. In order to reconcile these findings, we decompose total 
employment changes into population and employment changes for three categories: DI 
beneficiaries, denied applicants and non-applicants. Our results show that during the early 1990s, 
the growth in DI can fully explain the employment decline for men only under an extreme 
assumption about the employment potential of beneficiaries. For the period after the mid-1990s, 
we find little role for the DI program in explaining the continuing employment decline for men 
with work limitations. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last 25 years the Social Security Disability Insurance Program (DI) has grown dramatically.  
In 1985 2.2 percent of individuals between the ages of 25 and 64 were receiving DI benefits.  By 2008 
this fraction had more than doubled to 4.6 percent. A significant share of this growth can be account for 
by the growing work force attachment of women.  However, even among men, DI participation grew 
rapidly over the period, rising from 3.1 to 4.8 percent of 25-64 year old men.   Congressional reforms 
that, importantly, made it substantially easier for those suffering from severe pain or depression to 
obtain benefits together with increases in the effective after tax replacement rate plausibly contributed 
significantly to both these increases and the downward shift in the age distribution of awards (Rupp & 
Stapleton, 1995; Autor & Duggan, 2006).  With rapidly expanding rolls together with the shift in the age 
distribution of awards, there has been a natural concern that many of those being awarded DI benefits 
may be quite capable of work.  The fear was partially fueled by the fact that, during the 1990s and 
2000s, while employment rates for working-aged men remained constant, as Figure 1 shows, the 
employment rates for men with work limitations fell (Burkhauser, Daly, Houtenville, & Nargis, 2002).
1   
Several recent influential studies using aggregate data have suggested that the recent growth in the 
DI program may account for much, if not all of the employment decline of men with work limitations. At 
both the national and the state level, Bound and Waidmann (2002) regress the fraction of men out of 
work with health impairments on the fraction receiving DI, and Autor and Duggan (2003) estimate 
similar cross-state regressions for the period 1978 to 1998 for high-school drop-outs, who represent a 
disparate share of those on DI. In both studies, the increase in DI participation appears to have had a 
major negative effect on employment of men with the highest probability of applying for and receiving 
DI benefits. In contrast to these analyzes, studies that have used rejected disability insurance applicants 
to measure the labor market potential of beneficiaries have found that rejected applicants have low 
earnings and employment rates. Bound (1989) analyzes two samples of denied applicants from the 
1970s. Arguing that rejected applicants should be more capable of work than are actual beneficiaries, he 
argues that their employment rate can be thought of as an upper bound estimate of how much 
beneficiaries would work had they not applied for DI. He finds an employment rate for denied male 
applicants of no more than 50 per cent. These results have been replicated for the same age category of 
men (45 years and older) by von Wachter et al. (2009), who use administrative records spanning the 
period 1978 to 2004. Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) find similar results using data from the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) covering the 1990s. They exploit a discontinuity in the 
determination process to estimate the disincentive effect for a subgroup of applicants whose 
determination is based on vocational factors.
2 They estimate that the employment rate of these DI 
beneficiaries would have been only 20 percent higher had they not received benefits. These results have 
                                                           
1 Correspondingly, while employment rates for women increased during the same time, employment rates for 
women with a work limitation remained constant. 
2 Initial Application for disability insurance follows a five-stage procedure. Vocational factors are considered at the 
fifth stage for those applicants who have not qualified for disability insurance based on severe impairments. See 
Hu, et al. (2001) for a description of the application process. 2 
 
generally been interpreted as evidence that the increased availability and generosity of DI benefits could 
have had at most a moderate effect on the employment rates of people with work limitations. 
These two approaches to estimating the disemployment effects of DI are, at best, estimating 
different parameters.  Rejected applicant studies purport to estimate bounds on the effect of DI on the 
employment of those on DI.  In program evaluation literature this would be referred to as the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATET).  In contrast, the aggregate studies purport to be estimating the 
effect of implicit and explicit policy shifts during the 1980s on employment rates.  This could be thought 
of as a local average treatment effect (LATE).  It seems plausible that DI would have larger 
disemployment effects on marginal applicants than on infra-marginal applicants.  Still, the gap between 
estimates based on the aggregate and the denied applicants studies is so large, it seems doubtful that a 
difference between marginal and average applicants could fully explain the discrepancies between these 
two methods. 
Each approach involves making assumptions that are open to some question. On the one side, 
Bound and Waidmann (2002) and Autor and Duggan (2003)  observe only ecological correlations.  It is 
possible, though, that men with work limitations found it increasingly difficult to work during the time 
period, while the DI program drew from a population with relatively low employment rates. If this were 
the case, the approach used by these studies would overstate the effect of the increase in the 
availability of DI benefits on the employment of men.  On the other side, Bound (1989), Chen and van 
der Klaauw (2008) , and von Wachter et al. (2009) provide accurate estimates of the counterfactual 
employment rate of beneficiaries only if the application process itself does not substantially reduce 
employment for denied applicants. Furthermore, Bound's and Chen and van der Klaauw's results pertain 
to men 45 years or older.
3   
We overcome limitations of these two approaches by identifying an additional control population 
(non-applicants) through administrative records, and by assessing the expansion of the DI system jointly 
with employment rates for different application and age groups. Our results clarify that the employment 
decline during the early 1990s can only be explained by the concurrent DI expansion if the marginal 
beneficiaries would have worked at rates comparable to non-applicants, were they not receiving 
benefits. This seems doubtful.  In addition, we extend the analysis past the period of rapid expansion of 
the DI program.  Employment rates for men with work limitations continued to decline in the late 1990s 
and early 2000, despite a slowdown in the rate of growth of DI. This fact alone would seem to suggest 
important other factors at work.  
Section 2 briefly discusses main features of the DI program as well as major policy changes over the 
last decades. In section 3, we develop and discuss the decomposition. Section 4 provides a description of 
the main data sources used for this study. It is followed by results (section 5) and concluding remarks 
(section 6). 
                                                           
3 Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) exploit discontinuities for ages 45, 50, and 55. Therefore, by construction, they 
estimate the average treatment effect for these age groups only. 3 
 
2. Background 
The federal government provides cash and medical benefits to the disabled through two programs, the 
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program, which was enacted in 1956, and the Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) program, enacted in 1974. For both programs, successful application requires the 
 (...) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 
has lasted, or can be expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months.
4  
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the DI program was made available to a wider range of people. In 1960, 
individuals under the age of 50 were made eligible for DI, and in 1965, the definition of disability was 
liberalized to allow those without permanent disabilities to qualify. In 1972, the waiting period required 
before an applicant for DI could start receiving benefits was reduced from six to five months and benefit 
levels increased. By the mid-1970s typical after-tax replacement rates reached 60 percent. In addition, 
the introduction of the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI) effectively eliminated the work 
history requirement for those without either significant assets or other sources of income. With the 
increase in both the availability and generosity of the program, it is no surprise that DI rolls grew rapidly 
during the 1960s and 1970s, reaching 2.9 million (3 percent of the working-age population) by 1980. 
Total benefits paid out exceeded $15 billion, or 20 percent of benefits paid out for retirement. During 
the 1970s, concern grew that the Social Security Administration was losing control over the system and 
that many DI beneficiaries might not actually be eligible under the law.  The Social Security 
Administration responded both by trying to refine the regulations guiding decisions, and by negotiating 
agreements with various states. The consequences were quite dramatic. Award rates fell from 48.8 to 
33.3 percent between 1975 and 1980, with this fall concentrated among states that had been more 
lenient in their decision making. Then in 1980 Congress passed legislation designed to tighten 
administrative control over the disability determination process in a number of ways. The 1980 law 
changed both the frequency and the nature of medical eligibility reviews for disability beneficiaries, and 
it had a discernible impact on administrative practice. The number of new awards continued to drop 
from 40 to 29 percent of all insured workers between 1980 and 1982. At the same time, there was a 
five-fold increase in the number of terminations. In two years' time, 25 percent of beneficiaries had their 
cases reviewed and more than 40 percent of those reviewed had their benefits terminated. These 
stricter practices led to questions about due process. Many who had their benefits terminated during 
this period won reinstatement on appeal, and concern grew that many of those who did not appeal 
their terminations were, in fact, eligible for benefits. 
Widespread criticism led Congress to reverse course in 1984. These amendments had a profound 
effect on the standards used to evaluate DI eligibility.  First, the burden of proof was shifted onto the 
Social Security Administration to demonstrate that the health of beneficiaries under review had 
                                                           
4 See Title II of the Social Security Act, Section 223. [42U.S.C. 423], (d) (1) (A) 
(http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OP_Home/ssact/title02/0223.htm.)  4 
 
improved sufficiently to allow them to return to work. Second, a moratorium was imposed on 
reevaluations of the most troublesome cases --- those that involved mental impairments or pain --- until 
more appropriate guidelines could be developed. Third, benefits were continued for those whose 
terminations were under appeal. Fourth, more weight was given to source evidence (evidence provided 
by the claimant's own physician) by requiring that it be considered first, prior to the results of an SSA 
consultative examination.  Fifth, consideration had to be given to the combined effect of all of an 
individual's impairments, regardless of whether any single impairment was severe enough to qualify the 
individual for benefits. Finally, and perhaps most important, the Social Security Administration 
substantially revised its treatment of mental illness, reducing the weight given to diagnostic or medical 
factors and emphasizing the ability of an individual to function in work or work-like settings.  Further 
liberalization in eligibility criteria were implemented in 1988 and then again in 1991 when the Social 
Security Administration issued new rulings on pain that gave controlling weight to source evidence when 
such opinions were supported by medical evidence and were not inconsistent with other evidence in the 
case record.  In addition, court opinions throughout the 1980s and early 1990s tended to reinforce SSA 
shift in favor of source opinions (Social Security Advisory Board 2001). 
3. Empirical Methodology 
We decompose the overall change in employment rates for those experiencing a work limitation 
into changes within and between application categories. Consider the following decomposition of the 
employment rate of men with some health impairment at a time      : 
                                               , 
where the b, d, and n subscripts index beneficiary, denied applicant and non-applicants, respectively, 
and E's represent first the overall employment rate of those with work limitations, and then the 
employment rates of those on DI, those who applied for DI benefits but were rejected and, finally, those 
who never applied for benefits. In this decomposition we ignore men who are currently applying for DI 
and former beneficiaries whose benefits were terminated. Both groups are small and do not change the 
empirical results. The W's represent the fractions of the population, among those identifying themselves 
with work limitations, in each group. The employment rate for       can be decomposed in the same 
fashion: 
                                               , 
Taking the difference between the two time periods and denoting changes by   yields: 
                                                                                                              ,  (1) 
where upper bars indicate averages taken over two periods.  We can rewrite equation (1) using the fact 
that                    . 
                                                                                                                                            .  (2) 5 
 
Equation (2) is simply an accounting identity. However, if we assume that newly induced DI applicants 
would have had employment rates similar to those of non-applicants, had they not applied for DI, then 
the first two terms have an economic interpretation. The first term                              in the 
decomposition measures the effect that the growth in the fraction of men on DI contributes to the 
decline in the employment of those with work limitations, while the second term measures the effect 
that the growth in the fraction of men who are denied applicants has on the employment decline. The 
last three terms represent the within group employment declines, which presumably reflect factors 
affecting the employment of the disabled that are unrelated to program growth.  It is not clear the 
extent to which any of these components are related tithe increased availability of DI benefits.  In 
particular, the last of these three components reflects employment changes amongst those who never 
applied for DI benefits.  It seems safe to assume that this component does not reflect any behavioral 
effect of the program.
5 
If the increased availability of the disability insurance program during the 1990s has mainly involved 
men who would previously have been working, then equation (2) accurately measures the employment 
effect of the disability insurance program during this time. It is seems more plausible, however, that this 
form of decomposition overstates the role of the DI growth, since it assumes that denied applicants and 
beneficiaries would have the same employment rate as non-applicants if they had not applied.  
An alternative decomposition involves substituting out     instead of      in equation (1). We 
obtain then 
                                                                                                                         .  (3) 
In this case, the expansion of the DI program is weighted by the difference                      instead of                    . 
The leading term of this decomposition reflects the effect of the expansion of DI on employment if 
marginal beneficiaries would have had employment rates similar to denied applicants, had they not 
been receiving benefits, and if the application for DI itself does not reduce the employment of denied 
applicants. 
These two decompositions help us interpret previous studies on the employment effect of DI.  The 
approach by Bound and Waidmann (2002) and Autor and Duggan (2003) may be stated as estimating a 
type of the following specification: 
                 (4) 
If there is no correlation between     and other factors that affect the employment decline of men 
with work limitations then the OLS estimate     consistently estimates the employment effect of DI 
                                                           
5 With the expansion of DI, the size of the population of non-applicants will shrink.  Presumably this should mean 
the remaining non-applicants are more capable of work.  Thus, these compositional shifts should work in the 
direction of making this last term positive.  To the extent that this term is negative, it would seem to clearly point 
to factors unrelated to the increased availability of DI contributing to the decline in the employment of the men 
with work limitations. 6 
 
expansion. However, if factors other than the increased availability of DI benefits contributed to the 
employment decline, as seems entirely plausible, then   and    in equation (4) will be negatively 
correlated, and the magnitude of     will be biased upwards. Autor and Duggan (2003) address this issue 
by using instrumental variables. They exploit changes in DI generosity due to shifts in the wage 
distribution. A more obvious issue is that their IV estimates are very imprecise(the 95 percent 
confidence interval for men after 1984 includes the possibility that the growth of DI had no effect on 
employment decline). 
In contrast, studies that base inference on the behavior of denied applications such as Bound (1989), 
Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) and von Wachter et al. (2009)  interpret the first term of (3) as an 
upper bound estimate of the effect of DI expansion on employment. This use of denied applicants as a 
control group presupposes that the simple act of applying for DI benefits has no effect on employment.  
How plausible this presumption is open to question (see the interchange between Parsons (1991)  and 
Bound (1991) for a discussion of this issue). If applying for DI benefits had a negative effect on the 
employment of denied applicants, using the employment rate of denied applicants could understate the 
average treatment effect of receiving disability insurance for beneficiaries. In addition, in this case, any 
growth in the faction of men who are denied benefits would contribute to the employment decline of 
men.  
4. Data and sample selection 
Estimating the decompositions requires information about fractions of non-applicants, denied 
applicants, and beneficiaries, as well as their respective employment rates. We use the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP), a nationally representative sample of individuals 15 years of age and 
older in the civilian non-institutionalized population. Respondents are interviewed once every four 
months, for two to four years. When sampling a new SIPP panel, the Census Bureau randomly groups 
people into four rotation groups. Starting with the first rotation group, each subsequent rotation group 
is interviewed one month after the previous one. When interviewed, respondents are asked to provide 
information about the preceding four months, which are also called reference months. 
While the SIPP asks respondents about their employment situation and work limitations, it does not 
contain information regarding applications and application outcomes for DI. Several administrative files 
were used in order to identify beneficiaries, denied applicants, and non-applicants. These files were 
matched to SIPP records using respondent's Social Security Number (SSN). Since people who disclose 
their SSN systematically differ from people who do not, we reweight the original population weights 
provided by Census (Raghunathan, 2004) before selecting those respondents who disclosed their SSN. 
The administrative records are not available for SIPP panels 1986 to 1989. Therefore, our analysis is 
restricted to the SIPP panel 1984 and SIPP panels 1990s and later. 
We restricted out sample to men ages 25 and 61 who report a work limitation. We eliminate men 
younger than 25 because very few such individuals apply for DI and those older than 61 because they 
would be eligible for Social Security Retirement benefits. We limit ourselves to men who identify 7 
 
themselves as suffering from some kind of work limitation because men who experience no such 
limitations are very unlikely to either apply for DI benefits or have them awarded. 
Maag and Wittenburg (2003) have identified several problems with panels prior to 1996, interviewer 
prompting likely led to over-reporting of work limitations for all waves except the first one.  Therefore, 
we only use the first wave for these panels. For the 1996 and 2001 panels, we disregard the first waves 
due to apparent problems following questionnaire redesign.
6 We exclude men who have been in the 
army, and men who have applied or are currently applying for SSI but not for DI.
7 With these 
restrictions, the fraction of men identified as having a work limitation remains approximately constant 
through the years we examine (see Table 1).  For an exact decomposition, we also disregard current 
applicants and men who had received DI, but whose benefits had been terminated. Both groups are 
relatively small, and a more extensive decomposition which includes these two groups does not change 
the results.
8  Finally, we select the fourth reference month for each wave,
9  and use the last weeks' 
employment status, which corresponds to the standard CPS employment measure. Details on 
administrative records and the sample selection are contained in appendix A. 
Four waves are used for the decomposition. These are SIPP panel 1990, wave 1, SIPP panel 1996, 
wave 2, SIPP panel 2001, wave 5, and SIPP panel 2004, wave 1. The fourth reference month of the first 
wave of the SIPP 1990 covers January through April 1990, just before the recession of 1990/1991 and 
the expansion of the DI program started.
10 For the 1996 SIPP panel, the fourth reference month of the 
second wave covers July through October 1996, which corresponds to a time where the major 
expansion of the early 1990s had subsided. The 2001 SIPP was conducted around and after the 
recession of 2001, which occurred between March and November 2001. Since DI participation growth 
tends to lag the unemployment rate (Rupp & Stapleton, 1995), we choose wave 5 of the 2001 panel, 
which corresponds to May through August of 2002. We also use the first wave of the 2004 SIPP, which 
covers January through April 2004, because the full effect of the recession on employment and DI 
participation might only appear after the 2001 panel was conducted.
11   Besides these four waves, we 
will use all of the selected waves to discuss some of the findings of the decomposition. 
                                                           
6 See Appendix A for a discussion of these problems. 
7 People can apply for DI and SSI for the blind and disabled simultaneously if they fulfill the respective eligibility 
criteria. These dual applicant or beneficiaries are not disregarded. 
8 For the sample prior to disregarding current applicants and men who had received disability insurance, the 
fraction of current applicants is generally between 2.5 and 5.5 percent for the waves considered, and does not 
show any trend. The fraction of men those benefits have been terminated increases from about 1 percent to 3 
percent between the 1990 and 2004 panel, which is consistent with a decrease of terminations due to death and 
retirement, and an increase of terminations due to medical disqualifications since the late 1980s (Autor & Duggan, 
2006). 
9 This is the month preceding the interview month and therefore likely to be the least affected by recall bias 
regarding past employment status. 
10 Following the NBER business cycle dates, the recession of 1990/1991 started in July 1990. 
11 Results from the 2004 SIPP should be treated with caution, since the percentage of men with work limitation is 
noticeably higher as compared to previous panels. If the population with a work limitation in the 2004 panel is 
more healthy as compared to the population with a work limitation in previous panels, then both the overall 8 
 
5. Results 
Table 2 presents population fractions of men by applicant status, i.e. non-applicant, beneficiary, and 
denied applicant. At the beginning of 1990, slightly more than two thirds of men 25 to 61 years old with 
a reported work limitation are non-applicants, 19 percent are beneficiaries, and 13.9 percent denied 
applicants.  Older men are more likely to receive DI benefits, whereas the fraction of the population who 
were denied applicants was similar across age groups. By 1996, the picture had changed quite 
dramatically. The fraction of non-applicants had decreased by 10 percentage points to 56.9 percent. 
That decrease had been matched by a corresponding increase in the fraction of beneficiaries to 29.2 
percent. The fraction of denied applicants had remained stable during that time.
12  When comparing 
population fractions among age categories, one can see that the increase in beneficiaries was mostly 
concentrated among men 25 to 44 years old: the percentage of beneficiaries 44 years or younger almost 
doubled during that time. However, in absolute terms, the increase was highest for men age 55 years 
and older, those participation increased from 29.7 percent to 42.6 percent. By 2002, the fraction of non-
applicants had decreased even further, but only slightly to 53.4 percent. The fraction of beneficiaries 
had increased by another 4.2 percentage points, while the fraction of denied applicants had decreased 
slightly. Comparing the 1996 panel to the 2004 panel, we observe a further decline of the fraction of 
non-applicants to 51.8 percent, a 3.4 percentage increase in the fraction of beneficiaries, and a 1.8 
percentage increase in the fraction of denied applicants. 
Table 3 shows corresponding employment rates. The employment rate of non-applicants was 61.1 
percent in 1990, whereas denied applicants had an employment rate of 34.1 percent. Beneficiaries had 
an average employment rate of 5.7 percent.
13  Across age groups, men 25 to 44 years have similar 
employment rates as men 45 to 54, but their employment rates of non-applicants and denied applicants 
are much lower than those of men 45 to 54. In contrast, the employment rate of beneficiaries age 25-44 
was 14 percent, whereas it is less than 3 percent for beneficiaries age 45 or older. For non-applicants 
and beneficiaries, this pattern remains remarkably stable across most years and panels. These results 
imply that the difference in the employment rate of non-applicants versus beneficiaries is not 
necessarily larger for younger men as compared to older men.
14  
Table 4 presents the results using the first decomposition (equation 2). For the 1990-1996 
comparison, the decomposition suggests an estimated employment decline attributable to the 
increased availability of DI benefits that exceeds the overall employment decline if men 25 to 61 are 
considered. However, separate decompositions by age groups reveal that employment rates declined 
during that time period only for men who were 25 to 54 years old. For them, DI growth can explain the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
employment change and the role of DI growth would be understated. The overall bias for the decomposition is 
therefore unclear. 
12 It appears that an increase in the application success probability since the mid-1980s has mainly contributed to a 
stable fraction of denied applicants. 
13 As mentioned in section 2, beneficiaries are not prohibited from working fully, but may work to some extent, as 
long as their earnings do not exceed a certain threshold, called the “Substantial Gainful Activity” amount. 
14 For instance, in 1990, the difference is 46.5 percent for men 25-44 years old, but 66.9 percent for men 44-54 
years old and 51.1 percent 55-61 years old. 9 
 
entire decline in employment. The contribution of the DI expansion looks quite different using the 
second decomposition (equation 3). Table 5 presents corresponding results. This decomposition 
suggests that for men 25 to 54 years old, the growth in DI can now only explain about half of the overall 
employment decline. 
Decompositions for 1996 and the 2001 and 2004 panel show a much larger overall employment 
decline, which exceeded 10 percentage points for men 25 to 44 years old. No matter which 
decomposition is used, these dramatic employment changes were not nearly matched by a 
corresponding expansion of the DI program. For men 25 to 61 years old, the growth in DI for the 1996-
2001 comparison can only explain between 8 and 20 percent of the overall employment decline, 
depending on which decomposition is used. Over the period 1996-2004, the DI program can explain 
between 30 percent and 50 percent of the overall employment decline. Even more startling are the 
decompositions for the three different age groups. Especially for men 25 to 44 years old, the portion of 
the employment decline which is attributable to the expansion of the DI program is at most 20 percent. 
Further sensitivity analyzes for the SIPP which support this finding are explained in appendix B. 
While the SIPP data we have been working with have the distinct advantage of being matchable to 
data that allows us to identify those who have applied for DI benefits, there are a number of things 
about the data that raise concerns about the comparability of the data over time.  As we have discussed, 
the nature of the questions that allow us to identify how the population with disabilities has changed 
over time. In addition, the fraction of SIPP respondents matchable to the administrative data that allow 
us to identify DI applicants has declined over the years.  For this reason, we turn to the CPS.  Since 1989 
the public release of the March Current Population Survey (CPS) has included data identify those with a 
work limitation.  Over time, this question identifies a roughly constant fraction of working aged men 
that suffers from some kind of limitation that affects capacity for work (see Figure 3). The CPS data has 
not been matched to administrative data, and so cannot, in the data, determine who has applied for DI 
or SSI benefits. At the same time, it is possible to identify those who are receiving Social Security 
benefits.  For those under the age of 62 virtually all workers who receive Social Security benefits are 
receiving DI benefits.  Figure 4 shows DI participation by age categories. It can be seen that the fraction 
of male DI beneficiaries who are 25-44 years old remained constant between 1995 and 2007, or even 
decreased slightly. Corresponding employment trends by age groups from the CPS, as shown in Figure 5, 
reveal that employment rates declined the most among younger men between 1995 and 2008.  These 
patterns suggest that something other than the increased availability of DI benefits played an important 
role in the employment declines of those identified as suffering from a work limitation.  Finally, Figure 6 
shows trends in employment for those in the CPS who identify themselves as limited, but do not identify 
themselves as receiving Social Security or SSI benefits.  The CPS shows striking employment declines in 
this group. Since the fraction of denied applicants remained constant during that time period, this 
employment decline can be interpreted as occurring primarily among those who never applied for DI. 
6. Conclusion 
This study has attempted to reconcile divergent findings concerning the employment effect of the DI 
program. Using a decomposition strategy, we find that it is unlikely that the growth in the fraction of DI 10 
 
beneficiaries during the early 1990s can fully explain the employment decline. This result is 
substantiated by the steady employment decline during the mid-1990s to mid-2000s, with no 
corresponding strong increase in the fraction of beneficiaries. It therefore seems to be likely that other 
factors than the DI program have contributed to employment decline from 1990 to 2004. This is 
precisely the context in which the methods used by Bound and Waidmann (2002) and Autor and Duggan 
(2003) are likely to seriously exaggerate the causal role played by DI in explaining the decline in the 
employment of men with work limitations.  
Since they were enacted, some analysts and policy makers have feared that the DI reforms of the 
mid and late 1980s allowed a large number of work-capable men onto the rolls, leading to the dramatic 
decline in labor force participation among men with health-related work limitations. However, our 
analysis suggests that other factors were behind that decline in participation, and that the growth in DI 
rolls experienced in the 1990s was made up of men who would not have been working regardless of the 
DI expansion.  
If the DI expansion does not explain the drop in employment among men with work limitations, we 
are still left with the question of what does explain that trend.   While answering this question is beyond 
the scope of this paper, we can shed some light on directions for future research.  For example, SIPP and 
CPS data can be used to examine sources of household income for men with work limitations who are 
neither working nor receiving disability benefits.  For the families of these men, the earnings of other 
household members represents an important source of income as do benefits from various social 
insurance programs such as veterans and workers compensation benefits.   There is no reason to 
suspect that such things as workers compensation has become more available or more generous over 
the period in question, and, indeed, the SIPP and CPS data show, if anything, the reverse to be true.  
Beyond this, the fraction of men with limitations who are married with spouse present has fallen, 
making it harder for these men to rely on spousal earnings.  All in all, we see no evidence that the move 
out of the workforce is due to any increase in the availability of alternative sources of income.  At the 
same time, we find evidence that the earnings potential of this group has declined.    With a substantial 
and growing fraction of these men out of work, estimating their earnings potential is problematic, but if 
we assume that those who are not working would have earned below median earnings had they 
worked, we can consistently calculate the 75
th percentile of the potential hourly earnings distribution for 
these men.  Under this assumption, we find that this dropped by roughly one third between the early 
1990s and late 2000s, suggesting that a shift in the demand for the labor of men in this population may 
be behind their employment decline. 
   11 
 
7. Bibliography 
Autor, D. H., & Duggan, M. G. (2003). The Rise in the Disability Rolls and the Decline in Unemployment. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 157-205. 
Autor, D. H., & Duggan, M. G. (2006). The Growth in the Social Security Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis 
Unfolding. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20, 71-96. 
Benitez-Silva, H., Buchinsky, M., Chan, H. M., & Sheidvasser, S. (1999). An Empirical Analysis of the Social 
Security Disability Application, Appeal, and Award Process. Labour Economics, 6(2), 147-148. 
Bound, J. (1989). The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants. American 
Economic Review, 79(3), 482-503. 
Bound, J. (1991). The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants: Reply. American 
Economic Review, 81(5), 1427-1434. 
Bound, J., & Waidmann, T. (2002). Accounting for Recent Declines in Employment Rates among 
Working-Aged Men and Women with Disabilities. Journal of Human Resources, 37(2), 231-250. 
Burkhauser, R. V., Daly, M. C., Houtenville, A., & Nargis, N. (2002). Self-Reported Work-Limitation Data: 
What They Can and Cannot Tell Us. Demography, 39(3), 541-555. 
Chen, S., & van der Klaauw, W. (2008). The work disincentive effects of the disability insurance program 
in the 1990s. Journal of Econometrics, 142, 757-784. 
Hu, J., Lahiri, K., Vaughan, D. R., & Wixon, B. (2001). A Structural Model of Social Security's Disability 
Determination Process. Review of Economics and Statistics, 83(2), 348-361. 
Maag, E. M., & Wittenburg, D. (2003). Real Trends or Measurement Problems? Disability and 
Employment Trends from the Survey of Income and Program Participation. Urban Institute. 
Parsons, D. (1991). The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants: Comment. 
American Economic Review, 81(5), 1419-1426. 
Raghunathan, T. E. (2004). What Do We Do with Missing Data? Some Options for Analysis of Incomplete 
Data. Annual Review of Public Health, 25(1), 99-117. 
Rupp, K., & Stapleton, D. (1995). Determinants of the Growth in the Social Security Administration's 
Disability Programs -- An Overview. Social Security Bulletin, 58(4), 43-70. 
Szymendera, S. (2006). Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI): 
Proposed Changes to the Disability Determination and Appeals Processes. Congressional 
Research Service. 
von Wachter, T., Song, J., & Manchester, J. (2009). Changes in the Economic Outcomes to Allowed and 
Denied Applicants in Social Security Disability Insurance from 1978 to 2004: An Analysis using 12 
 
Longitudinal Administrative Records. 
http://www.columbia.edu/~vw2112/papers/dissa_vwjsjm_final.pdf. 
 
   13 
 
Figure 1: Employment rates for men, age 25-61, who indicate a work limitation, 1989-2007 
 
Source: CPS March Supplement 























Figure 2: DI participation for men, age 25-61, 1970-2007 
 
Source: SSA Statistical Supplement 




















Figure 3: Percentage of men, age 25-61, who indicate a work limitation, 1981-2008 
 
Source: CPS March Supplement 
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Figure 4: DI Participation for Men, age 25-61, 1970-2007 
 
Source: SSA Statistical Supplement and Census 
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Figure 5: Employment rates for men, age 25-61, who indicate a work limitation, 1981-2008 
 
Source: CPS March Supplement 
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Figure 6: Employment rates of men, age 25-61, who do not receive Social Security, 1981-2008 
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Table 1: Percentage of Men with Work Limitations 
 
   Men, 25-61  Men, 25-44  Men, 45-54  Men, 55-61 
SIPP 1990, Wave 1  9.96  6.82  12.52  23.23 
SIPP 1996, Wave 2  10.93  8.05  13.5  21.54 
SIPP 2001, Wave 5  10.38  6.99  12.3  19.8 
SIPP 2004, Wave 1  11.3  7.2  13.49  21.34 
         
Note - Original person-month weights provided by Census have been 
used.   
 
   20 
 
Table 2: Population Fractions 
 
  Non-Applicants  Denied Applicants  Beneficiaries 
  Percentage  N  Percentage  N  Percentage  N 
SIPP 1990, Wave 1             
Men  67.1  720  13.9  139  19.0  214 
Men, 25-44  75.4  368  12.9  63  11.8  58 
Men, 45-54  63.9  178  16.4  38  19.8  62 
Men, 55-61  57.0  174  13.3  38  29.7  94 
SIPP 1996, Wave 2             
Men  56.9  904  13.8  224  29.2  475 
Men, 25-44  64.9  456  13.3  99  21.8  158 
Men, 45-54  54.3  286  15.0  74  30.7  157 
Men, 55-61  44.0  162  13.5  51  42.6  160 
SIPP 2001, Wave 5             
Men  53.4  436  13.2  110  33.4  273 
Men, 25-44  61.1  186  15.8  46  23.1  71 
Men, 45-54  49.9  147  13.7  40  36.4  98 
Men, 55-61  46.2  103  8.8  24  45.1  104 
SIPP 2004, Wave 1             
Men  51.8  1000  15.6  293  32.6  615 
Men, 25-44  58.5  408  17.3  120  24.2  158 
Men, 45-54  51.6  343  15.9  101  32.6  214 
Men, 55-61  42.4  249  12.9  72  44.7  243 
             
Note - Corrected person-month weights have been used (see appendix A).     
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Table 3: Employment Rates 
 
  Total  Non-Applicants  Denied Applicants  Beneficiaries 
         
SIPP 1990, Wave 1         
Men, 25-61  46.8  61.1  34.1  5.7 
Men, 25-44  52.2  60.5  38.1  14.0 
Men, 45-54  53.2  69.8  49.1  2.9 
Men, 55-61  32.4  53.2  11.2  2.1 
SIPP 1996, Wave 2         
Men, 25-61  43.7  63.9  30.8  10.6 
Men, 25-44  47.4  60.7  38.5  13.3 
Men, 45-54  45.9  72.3  25.4  9.4 
Men, 55-61  33.3  60.2  22.8  8.8 
SIPP 2001, Wave 5         
Men, 25-61  33.6  51.2  27.4  7.8 
Men, 25-44  36.4  47.9  31.2  9.7 
Men, 45-54  33.9  54.1  27.9  8.5 
Men, 55-61  28.8  53.9  16.1  5.6 
SIPP 2004, Wave 1         
Men, 25-61  36.4  58.6  25.4  6.3 
Men, 25-44  35.9  51.3  21.7  8.9 
Men, 45-54  41.6  65.9  34.8  6.6 
Men, 55-61  31.0  62.9  19.3  4.2 
         
Note - Corrected person-month weights have been used (see appendix A).   22 
 
Table 4: Decompositions 
 
                             )                             )                                      
1990-1996             
Men, 25-61  -3.06  -5.54  0.02  1.75  1.19  -0.47 
Men, 25-44  -4.79  -4.72  -0.09  0.09  -0.12  0.05 
Men, 45-54  -7.26  -7.06  0.45  1.45  1.63  -3.72 
Men, 55-61  0.84  -6.57  -0.08  3.52  2.42  1.55 
1996-2001             
Men, 25-61  -10.16  -2.00  0.17  -6.99  -0.88  -0.46 
Men, 25-44  -10.96  -0.53  -0.50  -8.04  -0.82  -1.07 
Men, 45-54  -12.03  -3.10  0.47  -9.48  -0.29  0.36 
Men, 55-61  -4.48  -1.24  1.76  -2.82  -1.43  -0.75 
1996-2004             
Men, 25-61  -7.33  -1.80  -0.58  -2.87  -1.31  -0.78 
Men, 25-44  -11.46  -1.07  -1.03  -5.78  -1.02  -2.57 
Men, 45-54  -4.29  -1.16  -0.33  -3.39  -0.88  1.46 
Men, 55-61  -2.27  -1.19  0.23  1.18  -2.03  -0.46 
             
Note - Corrected person-month weights have been used (see appendix A).       
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Table 5: Alternative Decompositions 
 
                             )                              )                                      
1990-1996             
Men, 25-61  -3.06  -2.48  -3.04  1.75  1.19  -0.47 
Men, 25-44  -4.79  -2.47  -2.34  0.09  -0.12  0.05 
Men, 45-54  -7.26  -3.39  -3.22  1.45  1.63  -3.72 
Men, 55-61  0.84  -1.49  -5.16  3.52  2.42  1.55 
1996-2001             
Men, 25-61  -10.16  -0.83  -1.00  -6.99  -0.88  -0.46 
Men, 25-44  -10.96  -0.30  -0.73  -8.04  -0.82  -1.07 
Men, 45-54  -12.03  -1.02  -1.61  -9.48  -0.29  0.36 
Men, 55-61  -4.48  -0.31  0.83  -2.82  -1.43  -0.75 
1996-2004             
Men, 25-61  -7.33  -0.69  -1.69  -2.87  -1.31  -0.78 
Men, 25-44  -11.46  -0.46  -1.64  -5.78  -1.02  -2.57 
Men, 45-54  -4.29  -0.44  -1.05  -3.39  -0.88  1.46 
Men, 55-61  -2.27  -0.31  -0.65  1.18  -2.03  -0.46 
             
Note - Corrected person-month weights have been used (see appendix A).       24 
 
Appendix 
A.  Data Selection 
Administrative records: Applications are identified through so-called 831 files. When a person applies for 
DI, an 831 file is opened. It subsequently documents all application stages up to the reconsideration 
stage.
15   We use 831 files from 1978 onwards, which is the earliest year they are currently available. 
This restriction is likely to understate the number of denied applicants slightly, especially for the earlier 
years of the analysis. 
While 831 records provide accurate information on application dates and outcomes of initial 
application and reconsideration, they do not record appeal decisions. However, an increasing fraction of 
initially denied applications have been appealed. For instance, in 2002, about one-third of all 
applications were decided through the appeal process. Of these, more than three quarters were 
successful, as opposed to only 37 percent successful initial applications (Szymendera, 2006). These 
successful appeals would be misclassified as denial by 831 records. 
In order to improve on the accuracy of the application information of the 831 files, we augment 
them with the Master Beneficiary Records (MBR). The MBR contain complete application information 
including appeals, but only for the latest disability application. MBR records are matched to 831 files 
using dates of application. Furthermore, we use the Payment History Update System (PHUS) to identify 
successful appeals which have been erased from the MBR. The PHUS records monthly information on 
benefits received from 1984 onwards. They are matched to 831 files and MBR records using benefit 
begin dates.
16  
Work limitation: The SIPP contains a standard work limitation question: “Does [person] have a physical, 
mental, or other health condition which limits the kind or amount of work [person] can do?”  Before the 
1996 panel, people were asked this question during the first wave, and then only for some subsequent 
waves which contained health and disability modules. In these modules, people who had indicated a 
work limitation in a previous wave were reminded of his or her affirmative response before the question 
was asked again.
17  With the 1996 redesign, the work limitation question was included in all core 
surveys, and people were not reminded of their previous response. Maag and Wittenburg (2003) show 
that before the 1996 redesign, the prevalence rate of work limitation increased within each panel over 
subsequent waves, whereas such a trend is not visible for the 1996 panel. They hypothesize that those 
who indicated having a work limitation in a previous wave are more likely to respond positively to the 
                                                           
15 If denied benefits at the initial determination process, applicants can ask for reconsideration. If still denied 
benefits, they can further appeal the decision to an Administrative Law Judge and an Appeal Board. See Benitez-
Silva, et al. (1999) for a detailed analysis of the appeal process. 
16 In practice, dates of filing might differ for same applications in these files. Therefore, we matched records which 
were filed within 50 days. PHUS records are matched to 831 or MBR records if the benefit begin date is within 100 
days of the date an application decision has been reached. 
17 Specifically, they are asked: “We have recorded that [person]'s health limits the kind or amount of work [person] 
can do. Is that correct?” 25 
 
question if they were reminded about their earlier response. Figure A1 replicates their findings using 
SIPP panels 1984 to 2004 for men age 25 to 61. As can be seen, the prevalence rates generally increase 
within each wave before the 1996 redesign. In contrast, the 1996, 2001, and 2004 SIPP panels do not 
exhibit such a trend. 
As a consequence of this reporting bias, it is plausible that people with work limitations are 
relatively more healthy for later waves than for earlier ones. Consequently, employment rates of people 
with work limitation are likely to be upward biased for later waves of these panels.  Figure A2 
demonstrates the effect of the recall bias on employment rates. As the fraction of men indicating a work 
limitation increases for SIPP panels 1984-1993, so does their employment rate. In contrast, employment 
rates remain stable across waves for later panels.  
In order to circumvent the recall bias with respect to the work limitation question on estimates of 
employment changes, we restrict our analysis to the first wave prior to the 1996 redesign. Figure A3 
shows trends in the prevalence rates of men with work limitations, using wave one, two, and four of 
SIPP panels between 1984 and 2004. It illustrates that the prevalence rate remains fairly stable between 
1984 and 2004 when only same waves are considered. Figure A4 depicts corresponding employment 
trends for men with work limitations. The decline in the employment rate is similar to the CPS based 
trend of Figure 1, although it seems to have started earlier. 
We also disregard the first wave of the 1996 panel, since numerous changes implemented in the 
1996 SIPP redesign are likely to have affected data reporting for the first wave (Maag & Wittenburg, 
2003). As shown in Figure A1, the work limitation prevalence rate is somewhat higher for the first wave 
of the 1996 SIPP panel than in subsequent waves. This anomaly also appears for the 2001 SIPP panel. 
We suspect that similar implementation issues affected that wave, and disregard it as well. Concerning 
the 2004 SIPP panel, we consider the first seven waves only, because administrative records are 
currently available until the end of 2005. 
 SSN disclosure: Table A1 reports the percentage of men, 25 to 61 years old, who did and who did not 
disclose their SSN for selected waves of panels 1984 to 2004.
18  The percentage of men who disclose 
their SSN declines from 92% for the SIPP 1990 to 85% for the SIPP 1996, and further to 76% for the SIPP 
2004, wave 1. Moreover, the percentage is only 62% for the SIPP 2001, wave 1, and declines to just 
above 60% for subsequent waves of that panel. For that panel, the low percentage of disclosures was 
apparently caused by Census' asking about respondents' SSN through telephone interviews. 
The decreasing SSN disclosure percentage poses two problems. First, since those who do not report 
their SSN are subsequently disregarded, a lower disclosure percentage reduces the final sample size.
19  
Second, and more seriously, if men who disclose their SSN systematically differ from men who do not, 
                                                           
18 For these tabulations, we select men as described in section 4, except selection based on their SSN. Therefore, 
table 6 presents accurate percentages for the sample used for the decomposition prior to selection based on SSN 
disclosure. 
19 Leaving men who do not disclose their SSN in the sample is not an option since they would be classified as non-
applicants, even though some of them are beneficiaries or denied applicants. 26 
 
than selection based on SSN disclosure can bias the results from the decomposition. Table A2 shows 
demographic and economic characteristics for selected waves of those who disclosed and those who did 
not disclose their SSN, respectively. Men who disclosed their SSN are more likely to be better educated, 
married and employed than those who did not disclose their SSN. They also tend to be more likely to 
report a work limitation in the 1990 SIPP panel, but they are less likely to do so for the 2001 and 2004 
panel. For a given panel, these differences in observable characteristics suggest that we would overstate 
the employment rate among all application groups, and understate the fractions of beneficiaries and 
denied applicants, since these population groups are less likely to be higher educated, married, and 
employed. Moreover, since the percentage of men who disclose their SSN decreases over subsequent 
panels, we would expect these biases to become more severe for later panels. Consequently, we would 
obtain estimates for the increase in DI enrollment and for the decline in employment rates which are 
too low. In order to correct for these biases, we reweight the original population weights provided by 
Census to account for non-random selection by SSN disclosure status (see for instance Ragunathan, 
2004). For that, we estimate weighted logit models of SSN disclosure for each panel separately. We use 
the person-month weights provided by Census and include the same variables as in Table A2, except for 
flexible age dummies.
20  We then divide the original weights by the predicted values in order to obtain 
corrected weights. This procedure eliminates the biases which result from selection on SSN if this 
selection, conditional on the observable characteristics, is random.
21  
B.  Further sensitivity analyzes for the SIPP 
In order to substantiate our finding that the DI program can explain little of the employment decline 
in the SIPP since the mid-1990s, we combine each 1996 wave (except for the first) with a 2001 or 2004 
wave (except of the first 2001 wave), carry out the first decomposition, and aggregate the results into 
two sources of employment changes: the employment effect due to changes in DI beneficiaries and 
denied applicants (the first two terms in equation 2), and changes in employment rates of non-
applicants, beneficiaries, and denied applicants (the last three terms of equation 2). This procedure 
produces 88 decompositions for the 1996-2001 comparison, and 77 for the 1996-2004 comparison. For 
the 1996-2001 comparison, all 88 employment changes are negative and so are the total employment 
effects of the DI program. For the 1996-2004 comparison, the two changes have the same sign for 66 
out of 77 cases, but in eleven cases, the employment change is positive while the effect of the DI growth 
is negative. However, as argued earlier, the results for the 2004 panel are likely to be confounded by 
much stronger changes in the percentage of men indicating a work limitation (see footnote 11). For 
                                                           
20 We use the following age categories: 25-29 years, 30-34 years, 35-39 years, 40-44 years, 45-49 years, 50-54 
years, and 55-61 years. 
21 In order to verify our supposition regarding the bias due to SSN disclosure, we compared population fractions, 
employment rates, and decompositions using the original person-month weights and the corrected person-month 
weights. The correction does increase the fraction of DI recipients and denied applicants, as well as decrease the 
employment rates for all applicant groups. Furthermore, these changes tend to be more severe for panels with a 
lower disclosure percentage. For the decomposition, we find that using the corrected weights slightly reduces the 
role of the expansion of the DI program in explaining the observed employment declines. 27 
 
those cases for which both differences are negative, the total employment effect never explains more 
than 50 percent of the overall employment decline. 
As a second way to validate the above result, we investigate the employment rate of non-applicants. 
If the growth in the DI program since the mid-1990s cannot explain much of the decline of the 
employment rate of men with work limitations, then we would expect a decrease in the employment 
rate of non-applicants during that time. However, using trends of employment rates from the SIPP may 
be misleading, since the percentage of men who report a work limitation decreased over subsequent 
waves for the 1996 and 2001 wave. Whether this change in self-reported work limitations is a point of 
concern depends on why the percentage of men who report work limitations declined. Figure A5 shows 
the percentage of men with work limitations for two categories, namely whether the respondent had 
participated in all waves of a panel or whether the respondent did not. The fractions of men with work 
limitations are generally higher for those who did not participate in all waves as compared to those who 
did, and this fraction also declines over subsequent waves. Hence, it appears that men with more 
serious health problems are more likely to drop out of a panel. In contrast, those who remained in a 
panel for all waves have a relatively stable probability of work limitation in both the 1996 and the 2001 
panels. The decline of the fraction of men with work limitations over subsequent waves would 
therefore, if at all, understate the real employment decline of non-applicants, since those who drop out 
of the panel are likely to be more severely impaired and less likely to be employed. Figure A6 presents 
trends in employment of non-applicants by participation. The employment rate increased somewhat 
until the fifth wave of the 1996 panel, corresponding to the first quarter of 1997, but then decreases 
until wave 12, which corresponds to the last quarter of 1999. A further decline can be observed for the 
2001 panel. 28 
 
Figure A1: Percentage of men, age 25-61, who indicate a work limitation, by SIPP wave and panel 
 
Source: SIPP panels 1984-2004. Original person-month weights provided by Census have been used. 











































































Figure A2: Employment rates of men, age 25-61, with work limitation, by SIPP wave and panel 
 
Source:  SIPP panels, 1984-2004. Original person-month weights provided by Census have been used. 









































































Figure A3: Percentage of men, age 25-61, who indicate a work limitation (waves 1, 2, and 4 for various 
panels) 
 
Source: SIPP panels 1984-2004. Original person-month weights provided by Census have been used. 

















Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 431 
 
Figure A4: Employment rates of men, age 25-61, with work limitation (waves 1, 2, and 4 for various 
panels) 
 
Source: SIPP panels 1984-2004. Original person-month weights provided by Census have been used. 




















Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 432 
 
Figure A5: Percentage of men, age 25-61, who indicate a work limitation (by participation status) 
 
Source: SIPP panels 1984-2004 matched to administrative records. Corrected person-month weights have 
been used. (See appendix A for details) 
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Figure A6: Employment rates for non-applicant men, age 25-61, with work limitation (by participation 
status) 
 
Source: SIPP panels 1984-2004 matched to administrative records. Corrected person-month weights have 
been used. (See appendix A for details) 34 
 
Table A1: Disclosure of Social Security Numbers 
Panel  Wave 
SSN non-disclosure  SSN disclosure 
Percentage  N  Percentage  N 
1984  1  13.58  1578  86.42  10011 
1990  1  7.9  1048  92.1  11590 
1991  1  11.31  929  88.69  7562 
1992  1  11.5  1236  88.5  10214 
1993  1  12.26  1360  87.74  10239 
1996  2  15.2  2971  84.8  16996 
1996  3  15.08  2896  84.92  16535 
1996  4  15.27  2837  84.73  15956 
1996  5  15.17  2755  84.83  15383 
1996  6  15.17  2649  84.83  14861 
1996  7  15.24  2597  84.76  14396 
1996  8  15.47  2625  84.53  14224 
1996  9  15.47  2563  84.53  13971 
1996  10  15.39  2517  84.61  13746 
1996  11  15.49  2516  84.51  13600 
1996  12  15.75  2578  84.25  13597 
2001  2  37.86  6234  62.14  10280 
2001  3  38.78  6178  61.22  9876 
2001  4  38.64  6088  61.36  9685 
2001  5  39.43  6122  60.57  9415 
2001  6  39.51  6170  60.49  9343 
2001  7  39.77  6138  60.23  9244 
2001  8  39.94  6071  60.06  9046 
2001  9  40.19  5940  59.81  8783 
2004  1  23.65  5231  76.35  20021 
2004  2  21.09  4374  78.91  19093 
2004  3  20.19  4049  79.81  18428 
2004  4  19.31  3813  80.69  18093 
2004  5  18.23  3531  81.77  17840 
2004  6  17.16  3281  82.84  17636 
2004  7  16.06  3081  83.94  17471 
           
Note - Data source is SIPP panels 1984-2004 matched to administrative records. 
Table entries are for men, 25-61 years old. We exclude from the sample: (i) men 
who have been in the military; (ii) men who have applied or are currently applying 
only for SSI; and (iii) men who are currently applying for DI/SSI or who were 
beneficiaries for DI. Details concerning sample selection see appendix A. Original 
person-month weights provided by Census have been used to compute 
percentages. 35 
 
Table A2: Demographic Characteristics by SSN Disclosure 
  1990, Wave 1  1996, Wave 2  2001, Wave 5  2004, Wave 1 
   no SSN  SSN 
test 
stat.
1  no SSN  SSN 
test 
stat.
1  no SSN  SSN 
test 
stat.




Age  40.58  40.11  0.58  40.04  40.94  -2.85  41.43  42.36  -3.11  39.81  42.98  -9.33 
HS graduates  82.56  83.83  1.07  83.09  88.87  79.10  88.05  90.04  14.93  79.63  91.92  658.93 
Some college  41.78  47.22  11.16  33.61  40.57  50.80  39.90  43.27  17.12  36.42  51.14  359.34 
Married  63.10  68.73  13.95  58.53  68.00  101.56  61.93  66.39  32.23  50.46  69.02  629.16 
Work limited  7.04  9.38  5.91  9.41  9.43  0.00  9.29  8.33  4.01  12.68  8.93  65.90 
Employed  84.89  87.01  3.50  84.09  88.33  42.01  82.57  86.67  48.72  77.96  86.81  253.77 
Empl. if lim.   38.30  47.20  1.96  36.86  44.52  5.32  26.13  38.10  21.67  26.34  40.18  42.88 
 
Note - Table entries are percentages except for the mean of age. Data source is SIPP panels 1984-2004 matched to administrative records. Table entries are 
for men, 25-61 years old. We exclude from the sample: (i) men who have been in the military; (ii) men who have applied or are currently applying only for SSI; 
and (iii) men who are currently applying for DI/SSI or who were beneficiaries for DI. Details concerning sample selection see appendix A. Original person-
month weights provided by Census have been used to compute percentages and means. 
 
1 t-statistic (for mean differences) or chi-square (for proportions) is used. 
 